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Abstract
A common concern regarding the viability of institutional reform of the EU is whether European
citizens constitute a political community that facilitates democratic governance.  One important
aspect of this concern is whether or not public perceptions are structured so as to ease or impede
political discourse across Europe.  To investigate this question, we examine whether the EU mass
public organizes its attitudes toward EU policy issues in systematic and meaningful ways. Specifically,
we examine whether EU citizens' attitudes across a broad range of policies decided at the EU-level are
structured consistent with several prominent models of the EU policy-space. Using Eurobarometer
surveys collected in the 15 member states in 1996, we show that, for the mass public, policy positions
on EU issues are systematically organized. Moreover, the substantive structure of this policy space is
consistent with a common model of the EU policy space suggested by Hix (1998): a socio-economic
left-right and a national sovereignty-supranational integration dimension.
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A variety of scholars have noted that the absence of a European demos is
fundamentally problematic for the future political integration of the European Union.  For
example, Scharpf (1999: 187) argues that the democratic deficit is due large part to the lack of
common identity and European-wide policy discourse. This deficit cannot be filled simply by
institutional reforms designed to enhance the opportunity for popular influence through, for
example, a more powerful European Parliament.  Similarly, Weiler (1995) argued that a
shared identity and common purpose are necessary for democratic institutions functioning
legitimately under majority-rule.  The evidence discussed previously supports the assertion in
these arguments that the EU public lacks the sense of common European identity that
defines a demos.  I am less convinced that the lack of such a common identity is crucial for
stable and legitimate democratic institutions (Gabel 1998a).  If we define a legitimate
democracy as one with a demos, then clearly the conclusion that democracy cannot be
legitimate without a demos is true.  But, at least empirically, there is ample evidence that
regimes that lack a demos but that are commonly understood as democratic endure for long
periods—e.g., consocational democracies. And, if we employ a common definition of a
legitimate regime as one that enjoys voluntary compliance by the governed, then we also
observe legitimate democratic regimes that endure—again, consider consociational
democracies.
But, of course, a demos does facilitate legitimate democratic institutions, particularly
those that rely on majority-rule.  Given that proposals for further institutional reforms of the
EU include the expansion of majoritarian decision-making in the European Parliament for a
broad array of policy areas, it is therefore important to address the question of demos.
Specifically, I want to focus on one aspect of mass attitudes relevant to EU governance: the
existence (or not) of a common EU policy space.  As Sharpf notes, one key aspect of the
democratic deficit is the lack of a Europe-wide policy discourse.  In national contexts, this
discourse and policy space is usually defined by a simplifying language—often referred to in
terms of ideology—that facilitates political communication and competition.   For example,
the left-right ideological dimension is crucial to how voter choose among parties, parties
compete for voters, and policy positions are packaged in party platforms.  In the absence of
this structure on the policy space, citizens would lack a central component of political
discourse, undermining meaningful political participation.  Also, if citizens view all policies
through a national or regional lens, then ideological discourse is basically impossible.  In
contrast, where a fairly simple ideological structure underlies political discourse, voters can
identify policy packages that cross-cut ethnic or geographic differences and facilitate
compromise and generate stable policy outcomes.  Thus, one key question for whether future
institutional reforms of the EU can succeed is whether or not an ideological structure
underlies mass attitudes on EU policy.
In the remainder of this paper, we examine this question.  In the subsequent sections
we will describe several contending models of the EU policy-space that generate testable
predictions about how citizens structure their preferences over EU policy. We then test these
predictions using survey data collected in the fifteen member states.
Models of the EU Policy-Space
How do citizens structure their preferences over EU policies? In the study of citizens’
policy preferences in representative democracies, this question is typically answered by
developing an empirical model that simplifies voters’ preferences across a host of issues into a
small number of dimensions. Fundamental to this approach is the assumption that policy
positions are structured by underlying ideological dimensions that account for covariation in
these positions. These ideological dimensions represent the structure of political discourse,
representing a linguistic short-hand for political communication and competition.  Consistent
with a long tradition of research on mass political behavior, previous studies have conceived of
these dimensions as ideological constraints on citizens’ policy positions, such that citizens’
positions on a broad range of issues are related to each other in consistent and identifiable
ways (e.g., Converse 1964; Kinder and Sears 1985: 664).
Ideology therefore reduces differences in citizens’ positions over many policies to
differences in positions on a small number of dimensions. This implies that if one can uncover
the relationships between specific policies and the ideological dimensions (i.e., the policy
content of the dimension), then one can infer citizens’ positions on the ideological dimension
from their positions on the specific policies. Put another way, if we know how policy positions
are structured, we can infer a citizen’s position on one issue from his or her position on
another issue.  Again, if such an ideological structure exists, this represents the political
structure of political discourse.  If such a structure does not exist, political competition and
communication may be inefficient, at best, and impossibly complicated at worst.
In the absence of theoretical or conceptual guidance, such a model of the ideological
space could be created inductively by searching for patterns in policy positions. However,
exploratory analyses of this sort come at price. Usually, if the policy-space has more than one
dimension, statistical techniques for identifying the policy-space do not generate unique
solutions--i.e., there are multiple structures that fit the data equally well (Long 1983: 34).
Consequently, we prefer to use conceptual models to specify ex ante the relationships between
citizens’ policy positions and the policy-content of the ideological dimension underlying these
positions. We can then examine this underlying ideological structure through confirmatory
analysis.
Previous research on EU politics provides several different models of the EU policy-
space. None of these models has been explicitly specified for the mass public. Instead, these
studies have modeled the policy space of competition between national governments and
national political parties over EU policy (e.g., Garret and Tsebelis 1999). However, these
models of the political space are generally based on a rationale that also applies to the
electorate. For example, Marks and Wilson (2000) argue that the space of partisan
competition in the EU is based on the cleavages that structure domestic politics—which is
ultimately defined by voter preferences--because these cleavages structure the way parties view
policy at the national and the supranational level. In other words, the simplifying maps and
cues that parties use to organize their political world before voters at the domestic level
constrain how they view EU issues.
European integration may involve some new issues regarding national sovereignty that
do not fit onto these domestic political maps. For example, some scholars claim that EU
issues also involve a second dimension—national sovereignty versus integration (Hix 1999a).
In the context of the present study, it is important to note that the basic arguments for how to
characterize the political space in which parties or national governments compete for EU
policy are easily applied to voters as well. Like party leaders, voters also have cognitive maps
and cues (e.g., the left-right dimension) that they use to organize the political world in the
domestic arena, and these maps and cues provide a prism through which they can organize
their preferences over EU policies.
In the following analysis, we will focus on four models of the EU policy-space
presented in previous research. These models consist of two important elements: an
assumption about the number of dimensions and an assumption about the policy-content of
that dimension. Two models are one-dimensional. First, underlying an intergovernmentalist
or neo-functionalist view of integration is the idea that all EU issues are fundamentally about
national sovereignty (McNamara 1998). Viewed from this perspective, the European Union is
not unique. Instead, it is simply an advanced example of a new political space created during a
time of fundamental changes in the role of the contemporary nation-state (Kriesi 2000).
According to this view, recent processes of globalization and denationalization undermine
modern nation-states based on “territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of
legitimate dominion” (Ruggie 1993: 151).  We will refer to this as the national sovereignty
model.
As a consequence, according to this view citizens’ positions on issues ranging from the
adoption of a common currency, increasing EU regulation of the environment, or decreasing
EU aid to farmers are due to their position on a single national sovereignty-integration
dimension. This dimension is defined by the concerns for the speed of integration and the
delegation of national powers to the EU. Among others, this model of the political space was
adopted in Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) and Garrett (1992).
A second one-dimensional model of the EU policy space is based on the economic
component of the left-right dimension of national politics. Scharpf (1999) and Tsebelis and
Garrett (2000) argue that the current political space is defined by battles over market
regulation versus market liberalization. According to this view, issues of further integration
and substantive EU policies are all have implications for the level of regulation in the EU
market. If this model is correct, issues of regulation--environmental protection, consumer
protection, labor market constraints--should be prominent in defining the policy-content of
the EU policy-space.  We will describe this as the regulation model.
The third model, presented in Hix (1999) and Schmitt and Thomassen (2000),
contends that the EU political space is two-dimensional, and that the two dimensions are
unrelated or orthogonal. One dimension spans the conflict over the proper allocation of
authoritative competencies, similar to the national sovereignty-integration dimension
described above. This dimension captures conflict over who has the power to implement
political decisions. While some prefer that the Union exercise such authority, others favor the
member-states as the proper forum. This dimension should structure citizens’ attitudes on EU
issues due to their level of national attachment or concern for national sovereignty.
Hix also posits that the traditional socio-economic left-right dimension structures the
political space, and that this dimension is orthogonal to (independent of) the national
sovereignty-integration dimension.  Hix conceives of this left-right dimension as a
combination of two components:  economic intervention/liberalization and social
authoritarian/liberal values (Hix 1999: 73).  The first component involves government policies
designed to address employment, redistribution of wealth, and public ownership.  The second
component involves government policies directed at freedom of association, freedom of
speech, quality of life issues (e.g., environmental protection) and equality.  According to Hix
(1999: 74), the left is defined by libertarian social values and calls for redistribution while the
right is defined by authoritarian social values and liberal economic policies.
If this two-dimensional model is accurate, the EU political space would resemble the
traditional domestic political space on all issues but EU institutional or policy reform.
Moreover, we would expect that the two dimensions are not correlated with one another.  We
refer to this as the national sovereignty plus left-right model.
Finally, a fourth model put forward by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2000) essentially
contends that the EU political space is defined by the same two dimensions that Kitschelt
(1994) found in his study of the political space in current European democracies. These two
dimensions are similar to the two components of the left-right dimension defined by Hix
(1999) and discussed above. One dimension is the economic left-right dimension defined by
distributive issues and regulation of the economy. The second dimension is a ‘new/old politics’
dimension that is defined by support for Green/ Alternative/ Libertarian (GAL) values at the
one end and Traditional/ Authoritarian/ Nationalism (TAN) values at the other. The policy-
content of this dimension is defined by issues involving government transparency,
environmental protection, and advancing human rights on the GAL end and the control of
immigration, crime prevention, and protection of national cultures on the TAN end.
Consistent with the argument of Kitschelt (1994, 1995), Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson
(2000) contend that the new and old politics are correlated in their constraint on the EU
policy space and combine to generate essentially a single dimension of political competition
that cross-cuts the two dimensions. If this is the case, we would expect that there are two
dimensions—economic left-right and ‘new/old politics’-that structure citizen views on EU
policy issues, but that these dimensions also are correlated to a significant degree.1  We refer
to this as the new/old politics plus left-right model.
Data and Analysis
To investigate whether EU citizens’ attitudes to EU policy are structured according to
the models described above, we conducted several confirmatory factor analyses of
Eurobarometer survey data. Ideally, we would analyze a data set consisting of EU citizens’
preferences over all the policies that constitute the EU policy space--i.e., all policy areas under
EU authority. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we would then estimate how well the
hypothesized underlying structure of attitudes accounts for the observed covariation among
respondents’ policy preferences.
                                                                
1 Empirically, this argument is difficult to separate from the argument Tsebelis and Garrett, for example, make
because many of the policy indicators that would make up both a market intervention versus liberalization
dimension and the traditional economic left-right dimension overlap.
Unfortunately, exactly such a data set does not exist. The Eurobarometer survey asks a
uniform set of questions to respondents across all EU member-states, but rarely asks
respondents’ about their preferences over a large number of policies under EU authority.2
However, one notable exception is the question presented in Table 1, which was asked in
Eurobarometer 44.2 Bis (spring 1996).3 This question, applied to the list of policy statements
(a-y), largely meets our data needs. First, the list of policy statements covers a broad range of
areas of EU policy authority. Furthermore, while the list does not exhaust all EU policies, it
does include policy areas that are central to distinguishing among the models of the EU policy
space we seek to test. Second, the policy statements generally indicate a policy direction, not
simply a policy area. For example, respondents were not asked whether EU activity in the area
of international intervention is a priority. They were asked whether intervening “more firmly”
is a priority. This directional component is important for our data analysis, since we want to
examine how citizens’ policy positions across policy areas covary so as to define the policy
space.
(Table 1 about here)
The one clear weakness of this survey question for our purposes is that the respondent
is not simply asked whether he or she agrees with each policy statement. The respondent is
also asked whether the policy statement is a priority. Thus, it is possible that a respondent
might support EU polices that fight against drug trafficking but not consider it a priority,
resulting in a response of “not a key priority.” If this is the case, we would not be able to
distinguish such a respondent from one who was against more EU activity in the area of
fighting drug trafficking. Put differently, the question is probably tapping salience and
direction of each policy statement, and we simply want to extract the respondents’ preferred
policy direction.
Lacking a better survey, we have no solution to this problem. However, we should note
that the survey question design helps minimize this concern. The survey question does not
limit the number of policies the respondent can identify as a priority. Consequently,
respondents are not forced explicitly to prioritize among policy statements and can state their
directional preference regarding each policy statement. We will return to this issue when
interpreting the results of the analysis.
 Table 2 presents the correlations among the responses to the policy statements (a-y)
in Table 1. The focus of our analysis is whether these correlations among the policy positions
is structured according to the systematic patterns identified in the models described in the
previous section. We used confirmatory factor analysis to bring evidence to bear on this
question. Confirmatory factor analysis evaluates the performance of a particular factor
structure in accounting for the covariation among a set of variables--in this case, the set of
                                                                
2 The Eurobarometer does include a variety of questions concerning the creation of new EU policy authority, but
our focus is on preferences regarding existing EU policy areas.
3 The respondent could answer “key priority”, “not a key priority” or “don’t know.”  We coded these responses as
(0) not a key priority, (1) don’t know, and (2) key priority. We included “don’t know” as an intermediate category
because we expect it to capture indifference regarding the policy statement and because no indifference category
was made available. Also, a dichotomous variable would be problematic for conducting factor analysis.
policy statements. The factor structure specifies (a) how many dimensions or factors underlie
the covariation in policy positions, and (b) how specific policy positions relate to particular
underlying dimensions and to each other. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis for
each factor structure will then allow us to compare the fit of each structure to the observed
survey data.
Each of the four models specifies a particular factor structure underlying the survey
responses related to the set of policy positions. In order to test these models, we need to
specify specific hypotheses about how these dimensions relate to particular policy statements
and, in the case of two dimensions, how these dimensions are related. We can then assess
which factor structure best accounts for the relationships in citizens’ policy positions.  Note
that all of the models purport to define the policy space, which involves all issues. Thus we
expect, for each model, that the underlying structure is associated with all policy statements.
However, to clearly define the character of the dimension we must impose some constraints
on how particular policies relate to particular dimensions.  That is, we must force particular
policy statements that we identify as ‘markers’ for specific dimensions.  These markers serve to
define the dimensions.  We want to choose only enough markers for each dimension as
necessary to capture the character of that dimension.
The national sovereignty model posits that the EU policy space has one dimension that
accounts for respondents’ positions on the policy statements. In particular, policy statements
that raise issues of national sovereignty should load particularly strongly on that dimension.
The set of policy statements provided in the survey does not include many of these
statements. Partly, that is because we sought a survey question involving policy areas that the
EU already exercises supranational authority over, not issues that are still largely controlled by
national governments. However, several policy statements address issues areas over which, at
the time of the survey (1996), the EU institutions did not explicitly exercise supranational
authority. Specifically, policy statements (d) and (k) concern EU activity in policy areas that
are traditionally central to national sovereignty (military and monetary authority) and that
were not under EU independent EU authority.   We also suspect that several other policies
involve national sovereignty.4  The policies (b), (l), (m), and (p) all involve issue areas where
the EU did not yet exercise concrete authority.  At the time of the survey issues of
immigration, international crime, drug trafficking, and border controls were decided through
intergovernmental cooperation under the EU third pillar. Consequently, these policy
statements refer to activity by the EU that would serve to increase supranational authority
over these issues at the expense of national sovereignty. If the national sovereignty model
structure citizens’ EU policy space, we expect these policy statements to all relate to the
dimension in the same direction (positive or negative) and to have particularly strong loadings
on that dimension.  If citizens strictly view EU policy based on their willingness to give up
national sovereignty, then this dimension should dominate citizens’ policy attitudes.
 The regulation model also assumes one dimension that underlies citizens’ positions on
the policy statements, but that the dimension is characterized by economic concerns
regarding regulation of the economy. The policy statements (i) and (r) most closely capture
these concerns, as they call for activist policies at the EU level to intervene in economic
                                                                
4 Note that we have also conducted the analysis with subsets of these statements as markers for this dimension.
The results are consistent with those presented here.
markets (employment and consumer protection), presumably through regulation in the
market place. Thus, if this model defines citizens’ EU policy space, we expect these
statements to relate to the dimension in the same direction and to demonstrate strong
loadings on that dimension.
The national sovereignty plus left-right model posits that two dimensions underlie the
covariation in respondents’ policy positions. The first dimension is the national sovereignty
dimension described above. The second dimension is the primary dimension of contestation
in the EU member-states, which captures salient social and economic issues.  In the set of
policy areas available, we expect two particular policies to serve as markers for the two
components of the left-right dimension.  The issue of providing help to the poor should
identify the economic redistribution component and the issue of equal opportunities for
minorities should identify the equality component.   We expect these two markers to relate to
the left-right dimension in the same way and to have strong loadings on this dimension.
This model also assumes that these two dimensions are unrelated (orthogonal) to each
other. Thus, in our analysis of this model we will specify two unrelated dimensions, where one
is dimension structure attitudes on the national sovereignty policy statements and the other
dimension structure attitudes on the policy statements concerning policy decided supra-
nationally.
The new/old politics plus economic left-right model also posits two dimensions. One
dimension is structured by the ‘new/old politics’ cleavage based on a distinction between GAL
values and TAN values. Since these dimensions should be related to each other, we must pay
careful attention to capturing the subtle distinctions between the characters of these two
dimensions.  We expect several policy statements to serve as ‘markers’ for the new/old politics
dimension. This fundamentally distinguishes ‘new’ from ‘old’ politics.  Statement (g) focuses
on the environment, which captures the ‘green’ component of the GAL pole of this
dimension.  Statement (m) address crime issues, which Kitschelt (1994: 28) argues constitute
an important part of the ‘old politics’ component dimension. Statement (o) involves the
protection of human rights, which is a new politics issue.  Statement (h) refers to EU efforts
to make policy-making more transparent, which is a part of the new politics agenda.
Statement (p) captures a component of the ‘old politics’ dimension, which involves protection
from immigration.
These statements capture important components of the new/old politics dimension
and we find little reason to think they relate to an economic left-right dimension. Put
differently, if this model of the EU policy space is correct, variance in respondents’ attitudes
on these policies will be due only to their position on the new/old politics dimension.
However, we do not expect these items to load on the dimension in the same direction.  If
old/new politics defines the dimension, then (g), (h) and (o) to load in the same direction and
in the opposite direction as statements (m) and (p).
For the economic left-right dimension, we consider statements regarding economic
policy, redistribution, and regulation/protection of the market as ‘markers.’ Statement (i)
involves a fundamental component of government economic policy: employment policy.
Statement (w) refers to addressing income inequality.  Statement (f) addresses regulation of
the market to protect producers from imports.  If an economic left-right dimension exists, we
expect these policies to load strongly on this dimension and to load in the same direction.5
That is, respondents on the left end of this spectrum should be for greater EU activity in
fighting unemployment and addressing income inequality while those on the right should not.
It is important to note that this model is distinct from the national sovereignty plus
traditional left-right model in that the dimensions are expected to correlate highly with each
other. As Kitschelt (1994) argues in the domestic context, while these two dimensions should
have some independent substantive character, they are closely related that they can form a
hybrid dimension that cuts across their two dimensions. Consequently, we do not constrain
the dimension to be orthogonal in estimating this model.
 Results
Tables 3-5 present maximum likelihood results of the confirmatory factor analyses
designed to estimate how well the four models of the EU policy space account for the
observed structure of policy positions in the EU mass public.6 In addition to the standardized
results for the loadings of the policy statements on each dimension, we also report measures of
model fit. Consistent with recommendation of Hoyle and Panter (1995), we use the following
fit indexes: the goodness-of-fit-index (GFI, Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1981), the non-normed fit
index (NNFI, Bentler and Bonnett, 1980), the incremental fit index (IFI, Bollen, 1989), and
the comparative fit index (CFI, Bentler, 1990). The values of GFI, NNFI, IFI, and CFI range
from 0 to 1.0, with higher values indicating better model fit (Bentler and Bonnet, 1980; Hoyle
and Panter, 1995).  These measures are sensitive to the model complexity, so that greater
model fit due simply to fewer constraints on the inter-relationships of the variables is
discounted.
Note that the null hypothesis—that there is no structure to mass attitudes toward EU
politics—is viable.  Certainly the level of public sophistication and knowledge regarding EU
policy issues would suggest that citizens lack any structure to their attitudes on EU policy.
Model 1 in Table 3 provides evidence regarding the national sovereignty model. Consistent
with expectations, the underlying dimension relates in the same direction (positive) to the
policy statements calling for loss of national sovereignty over policy (e.g., creating an EU
army). That is, respondents who felt that “having a strong European currency” was a key
priority were also likely to consider “setting up a European army for common defense” a key
priority. However, the marker policy statements regarding national sovereignty are not among
the strongest loading policy statements on this dimension. Thus, we would not consider this
evidence of a single national sovereignty defining the EU political space for the mass public.
(Table 3 about here)
The results in Model 1 in Table 3 also test the regulation model. The marker policy
statements for this economic dimension load in the same direction (positive), as expected.
                                                                
5 We do not use the statement about a “strong currency” as a marker because we do not have a clear expectation
about whether this is a left or a right position.
6 We used EQS statistical software.
For example, respondents who considered “developing joint programs to fight
unemployment” as a key priority were also likely to identify “protecting consumers” as key
priorities for more EU activity. Thus, this dimension is consistent with the regulation
dimension defined by Tsebelis and Garrett (2000). However, while some of the marker
statements have strong loadings, the statements with the strongest loadings are difficult to
characterize as economic in nature. For example, promoting human rights and improving EU
transparency are certainly more representative of ‘new/old politics’ issues than economic
regulation. Thus, while the substantive character of this dimension appears much closer to the
regulation model than the national sovereignty model, the one-dimensional policy space has a
broader character than simply regulation.
Model 3 in Table 4 is designed to capture the constraints imposed by the national
sovereignty plus traditional left-right model of the EU policy space. Consistent with
expectations, the sovereignty dimension (Factor 2) underlies responses to the marker
statements in the expected way.  Respondents who consider creating an EU army as a key
priority also consider having a strong EU currency as a key priority. Put more generally,
citizens who support (oppose) increasing supranational political authority at the expense of
national sovereignty in one policy area tend to support (oppose) it in other areas.7  Other
policies that load strongly on this dimension also support this interpretation of the dimension.
The statement about increasing control of external borders refers to an aspect of EU activity
that, at the time of the survey, was not part of the first pillar of the EU.     Thus, the character
of this dimension appears to involve national sovereignty.
In addition, the domestic left-right dimension (Factor 1) also has a substantive policy
character that is consistent with expectations. Respondents who support economic
redistribution and government involvement in the economy also set as priorities policies like
environmental protection and equality of opportunity.  This structure of attitudes is
consistent with the substantive character of the domestic left-right dimension (e.g., Kitschelt
1994).
Finally, the model fit of this factor structure is good and an in improvement on the one
factor model presented in Table 3.  Thus, given the substantive character of the dimensions
and the model fit, we consider this model a better characterization of the EU policy space at
the mass level than the one factor models discussed earlier.
(Table 4 about here)
Finally, Model 4 in Table 5 provides a test of the new/old politics plus economic left-
right model of the EU policy space. The results for this model are ambiguous for the new/old
politics dimension (Factor 2).  On the one hand, the ‘new politics’ statements involving
environmental protection and increasing EU transparency have strong loadings in the same
direction. This is consistent with expectations.  On the other hand, the ‘old politics’
statements involving crime and control of borders also load on this dimension in the same
direction as the ‘new politics.  Moreover, two of the strongest loading statements—(x) and
(y)—are ‘new politics’ issues and they load in the opposite direction to the other new politics
                                                                
7 Note that if only the statements that most obviously involve a decrease in national sovereignty (creating an
army and having an EU currency) are used to mark this dimension, the results are consistent with expectations.
statements.  Thus, we do not find clear evidence that this dimension is a new/old politics
dimension.
The economic left-right dimension (Factor 2) appears to have the expected
substantive character. Two of the strongest loading policy statement on this dimension
involved redistribution to the poor.  Also, statements about addressing inequality (presumably
economic inequality) and unemployment load in the same direction as the redistribution
statements.
The results indicate that the inter-relationship between these two dimensions is
partially consistent with expectations. The correlation between factors is quite high (.901) and
positive. This means that those who identify policies on the economic ‘left’ as priorities are
likely to consider policies with positive loadings on Factor 2 as key priorities.  But, since the
character of the second dimension is unclear, the results do not support the theoretical
expectation about the connection between the policy content of the two dimensions.  on the
libertarian/alternative/green end of the ‘new/old politics’ dimension.
The model fit indices all indicate that this two-factor model performs worse than the
Hix model presented in Table 4 in accounting for the covariation in respondents’ priorities
across policy statements.  Thus, this model is inferior to the Hix model both in terms of the
substantive interpretation of the dimensions and the amount of the policy space accounted
for by the model.
(Table 5 about here)
Alternative Explanations
Before concluding, we want to return to our concern about the survey question and
how this might influence the results of our analysis. Recall that the survey question asked
respondents to identify whether or not they considered each policy statement a ‘key priority’
for more EU activity. The potential problem with this question design is that it asks both
whether the respondent agrees with the policy statement and whether the respondent
considers it a priority. Thus, the question taps salience as well as policy position. Our hope is
that, because the question did not limit the number of priorities the respondent could choose,
differences in the responses are largely reflecting policy positions. However, the variation in
responses may actually represent differences in citizens’ priorities over areas of EU
governance. If respondents are not reading the statements closely enough to discern policy
direction they may simply be responding based on their preferences over which issues should
be conducted at the EU level. Thus, we want to consider whether such preferences could
explain the results of the analyses before we accept the interpretations based on the models of
the EU policy space.
Dalton and Eichenberg (1998) developed three hypotheses regarding how citizens vary
in their preferences for EU governance over particular policies. We will examine whether the
results of the confirmatory factor analysis are consistent with any of these hypotheses. First,
based on functionalist theory, Dalton and Eichenberg (1998: 254) argued that support for EU
governance of policy should be greatest (weakest) for issues that are difficult (easy) to solve at
the national level and which have clear (dubious) benefits from international coordination.
For example, citizens should support EU policies that involve protecting the environment,
fighting international crime, and managing immigration and oppose policies designed to
address equal opportunity or protecting consumers. The evidence from Model 1 in Table 1 is
inconsistent with this hypothesis. Respondents who considered environmental protection or
fighting international crime as priorities also considered improving equal opportunities and
protecting consumers.
Second, Dalton and Eichenberg (1998: 255) hypothesized that citizens would support
EU authority in areas of “low politics” but oppose EU authority over “high politics” issues.
“High politics” includes foreign policy, defense, and control of the national economy. “Low
Politics” includes welfare policies and tariff policies. Thus, we would expect respondents to
put identify issues such involving the creation of a single EU currency and EU army as “not a
key priority” and issues such as trade policy and environmental policy as a “key priority.” This
hypothesis is not consistent with the results of the confirmatory factor analyses. In Model 1,
the low and high politics policies are positively related. Respondents who consider protecting
the EU from imports and protecting the environment as key priorities also tend to feel that
the creation of an EU army and having and a common currency are key priorities.
Third, Dalton and Eichenberg (1998: 255) hypothesized that citizens will support EU
governance of policies that they personally benefit from and oppose those policies decrease
their welfare in a utilitarian sense. While it is difficult to identify what this hypothesis implies
about variation in respondents’ priorities across policy statements, it seems highly unlikely
that the results of the factor analysis are due to such calculations by the respondents. Note
that all the policy statements load positively on a single dimension (see Model 1). The only
way that the utilitarian hypothesis could account for this is if respondents generally felt the
benefited from all of these policy statements. This seems very unlikely, particularly since some
of the policy statements concern redistribution of resources. Thus, we are confident that the
results of the confirmatory factor analysis cannot be explained by alternative explanations
related to these three hypotheses about citizens’ preferences over EU policy authority.
Discussion
Returning to our original concern, the results presented here indicate that citizens’
attitudes toward EU policies are far from random. In fact, we find systematic evidence that
the cognitive map of European voters has a meaningful structure that is theoretically
interpretable. Taken together, our results indicate that the European political space is two-
dimensional in voters’ minds, with a left-right and a supranational component to their policy
preferences. These dimensions are unrelated, so knowing a citizens’ attitude on left-right
position does not provide guidance as to where he or she stands in terms of the transfer of
national sovereignty to the EU
There are several questions this analysis was not designed to and therefore could not
address. For example, we do not know whether the attitudinal structure uncovered here is
stable over time; that is, whether this structure is a recent phenomenon or whether
Europeans’ attitudes have been structured this way for a long time. Moreover, this study was
not designed to examine the structure of attitudes within member states. Our working
assumption has been that the analysis of a truly European policy space requires the analysis of
the European electorate as a whole. It is possible if not likely that there are cross-national
differences that may be worth investigating. However, these should not detract from the
finding that Europeans as a whole conceptualize the space of contestation in the EU in one
dimension along a European left-right dimension.  And, it is difficult to explain the results
reported here with a story about widely varying structures underlying national publics’ views
on EU policy.  We accept that the degree to which the findings here speak to any national
public may vary in degree, but it is unlikely that very many national publics differ dramatically
in the structure of the EP policy space from this model.
The results presented here also should be reassuring for those worried about
representation in the EU. Even when people are not extensively informed about the details
involved in governing the Union, they use the shortcuts they know to make sense of EU policy
issues. These shortcuts are akin to what the shortcuts they use to make sense of politics at the
national level, but they come with a distinctly European flavor. Thus, people simplify the
complexities of European-level politics in a way that makes sense to them.
In addition, our results should be comforting to those interested in reforming the
democratic institutions of the united Europe. They suggest that voters’ conceptual map is not
random, and that the considerable political heterogeneity that exists across the member-states
does not necessarily pose an obstacle to achieving meaningful democratic representation in
the European Union.  Recall that the mass policy space identified in the issue is the same
policy space that Hix (1999) contends structures competition among political parties at the
EU level.  If this structure endures at the mass level, existing parties will not have to reinvent
themselves to contest European elections when truly European issues come to the forefront of
voters’ interests. As a result, building a European party system may not be as difficult as it may
seem at first glance. However, a fairly stable set of ideological constraints on how people view
European policy issues means also that parties may have a difficult time manipulating the
policy space at the mass level.
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Table 1:  Policy Areas Included in the Survey8
Some people expect the European Union to become (even) more active than now in certain policy areas.
For each of the following, please tell me if you consider it a key priority or not.
a. keeping peace by intervening more firmly in possible conflicts
b.  dealing with the immigration problem
c. protecting our European cultures in all their expressions:  art, cinema, etc…
d. setting up a European army for a common defense
e. paying less attention to the economy and more to social justice
f. protecting European Union products from non-member countries' products
g. making joint efforts to protect the environment
h. giving more information about decisions taken at the European level and their practical consequences
i. developing joint programs to fight unemployment
j. protecting us from non-European competition, from the USA, Japan, etc…
k. having a strong European currency
l. fighting drug trafficking
m. fighting  against international crime
n. preventing the import of manufactured goods from countries where working conditions are
unacceptable
o.  promoting the defense of human rights
p. increasing controls at all external borders of the European Union
q. supporting the poorer regions of the European Union
r. protecting consumers
s.  being closer to the citizens
t. improving equality of opportunity between men and women
u. creating better opportunities for smaller European Union member countries
v. ensuring that every European Union citizen can live, work or study anywhere in the European Union
w. giving more help to the poor and socially excluded in the European Union
x. giving more help to people in Third World countries
y. improving equality of opportunities for minorities
                                                                
8 Note that this is not an exhaustive list of all policy areas asked in the survey.  We only list the policy areas that
we felt were relevant for testing the theoretical models.
Table 2: Correlations among Responses to Policy Questions*
a b c d e f g h I j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x
a -
b .15 -
c .12 .24 -
d .20 .17 .23 -
e .11 .12 .17 .14 -
f .15 .19 .25 .23 .13 -
g .16 .21 .20 .08 .16 .14 -
h .13 .21 .26 .15 .16 .21 .27 -
I .17 .21 .17 .14 .19 .20 .25 .22 -
j .14 .19 .24 .24 .12 .50 .11 .20 .21 -
k .17 .17 .19 .31 .09 .27 .14 .19 .21 .26 -
l .16 .17 .12 .09 .12 .13 .22 .15 .21 .12 .11 -
m .17 .20 .14 .08 .13 .13 .28 .21 .22 .13 .12 .58 -
n .14 .19 .22 .15 .19 .27 .21 .26 .18 .28 .14 .18 .22 -
o .20 .22 .22 .12 .232 .16 .35 .30 .28 .15 .17 .24 .31 .27 -
p .16 .25 .23 .23 .13 .31 .17 .24 .16 .33 .19 .22 .22 .29 .21 -
q .17 .17 .25 .17 .21 .20 .25 .30 .26 .18 .24 .16 .18 .25 34 .22 -
r .14 .22 .28 .17 .19 .24 .24 .28 .26 .24 .20 .21 .24 .28 .33 .28 .33 -
s .13 .18 .25 .16 .21 .18 .23 .33 .24 .19 .18 .18 .21 .25 .31 .25 .30 .46 -
t .15 .19 .27 .15 .23 .17 .26 .28 .24 .17 .18 .19 .22 .27 .38 .22 .34 .39 .41 -
u .17 .17 .26 .18 .20 .22 .23 .32 .24 .22 .22 .18 .19 .27 .32 .23 .46 .34 .34 .40 -
v .17 .19 .23 .19 .16 .21 .23 .30 .29 .28 .28 .16 .19 .22 .30 .20 .34 .30 .28 .31 .35 -
w .17 .18 .23 .14 .25 .17 .26 .27 .30 .20 .20 .20 .23 .26 .38 .18 .48 .32 .32 .37 .40 .34 -
x .15 .15 .22 .14 .22 .10 .21 .20 .20 .16 .16 .15 .16 .21 .29 .13 .42 .24 .25 .32 .35 .26 .47 -
y .17 .18 .25 .16 .23 .16 .24 .29 .26 .21 .21 .17 .20 .26 .37 .18 .44 .33 .33 .41 .42 .35 .52 .52
*all correlation coefficients significant at .01 level
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Table 3.  Factor Patterns (Standardized Solutions) for Single-Factor Models




Intervention in intl. conflicts .306* .306*
Immigration .367* .367*
Protect EU cultures .444* .445*
Create EU army .320* .320*
Promoting social justice .359* .360*
Protect EU from imports .390* .390*
Protect environment .439* .439*
Increase EU transparency .499* .499*
Fight Unemployment .453* .454*
Protect from non-EU competition .389* .389*
Adopt a strong European currency .378* .360*
Fight drug trafficking .360* .360*
Fight international crime .409* .408*
Prevent import of goods made by child labor .464* .464*
Promote human rights .571* .571*
Increase control of EU external borders .423* .423*
Support poorer EU regions .613* .613*
Protect consumers .575* .575*
Being closer to the people .555* .555*
Improving equal opportunities between men and women .592* .593*
Creating greater opportunities for smaller member-states .609* .609*
Ensuring free movement of EU citizens .533* .532*
More help to poor and socially excluded .631* .631*
More help to third world .530* .530*
Improving equality of opportunities for minorities .635* .635*







Table 4:  Factor Pattern (Standardized Solutions) for National Sovereignty/Left-Right Model





Intervention in intl. conflicts .295* -
Immigration  - .289*
Protect EU cultures .431* -
Create EU army .177*
Promoting social justice .363* -
Protect EU from imports .357* -
Protect environment .427* -
Increase EU transparency .491* -
Fight Unemployment .440* -
Protect from non-EU competition .355* -
Adopt a strong European currency - .205*
Fight drug trafficking - .734*
Fight international crime - .758*
Prevent import of goods made by child labor .449* -
Promote human rights .568* -
Increase control of EU external borders - .339*
Support poorer EU regions .632* -
Protect consumers .567* -
Being closer to the people .554* -
Improving equal opportunities between men and women .603* -
Creating greater opportunities for smaller member-states .622* -
Ensuring free movement of EU citizens .531* -
More help to poor and socially excluded .656* -
More help to third world .557* -












Table 5:  Factor Pattern (Standardized Solutions) for New/old politics/Economic Left-Right
Model





Intervention in intl. conflicts .218* .100*
Control Immigration  .489* -.104*
Protect EU cultures .454* -
Create EU army .168* .159*
Promoting social justice .183* .191*
Protect EU from imports - .364*
Protect environment .467* -
Increase EU transparency .517* -
Fight Unemployment - .442*
Protect from non-EU competition - .366*
Adopt a strong European currency - .376*
Fight drug trafficking .404* -
Fight international crime .458* -
Prevent import of goods made by child labor .480* -
Promote human rights .588* -
Increase control of EU external borders .452* -
Support poorer EU regions - .649*
Protect consumers .600* -
Being closer to the people .579* -
Improving equal opportunities between men and women .351* .267*
Creating greater opportunities for smaller member-states - .626*
Ensuring free movement of EU citizens .136* .414*
More help to poor and socially excluded - .675*
More help to third world - .583*
Improving equality of opportunities for minorities -.171* .840*
Inter-factor correlation .840*
N
GFI
NNFI
IFI
CFI
54004
.898
.778
.802
.802
